INTRODUCTION
Since its birth in 2011, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's ("ACA") 2 Contraception Mandate (the "Mandate") 3 has been a frequent subject of discussion, debate, and litigation. From the outset, the government has defended the Mandate generally in the name of public health and gender equality. 4 While both public health and gender equality are well within the government's regulatory domain, these broadly framed interests are inadequate to survive the compelling As the Supreme Court unanimously held in O Centro, RFRA's "to the person" language requires that strict scrutiny is applied to the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to a particular religious claimant, rather than the broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of a law. 8 As will be explained, there is no compelling governmental interest under RFRA to enforce the Mandate against religious non-profits or closely-held businesses that sincerely hold religious objections, especially for coverage of contraceptives that operate to prevent implantation after fertilization.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court assumed arguendo that the government had a compelling interest in the Mandate in order to base its decision on narrow tailoring. 9 In doing so, the Court never conducted a RFRA compelling interest analysis. 10 The purpose of this Note is to argue that the government lacks a compelling interest in enforcing the Mandate against religious non-profits or closely-held businesses after such an organization proves that the Mandate substantially burdens a sincere religious belief. Part I lays the scope and foundation of this Note, providing information on RFRA's compelling interest test, the organizations and their beliefs, the Mandate, and the coverage mandated. Part II applies RFRA's compelling interest test to religious non-profits and closely-held businesses. It notes the numerous 5 9 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (finding it unnecessary to adjudicate the compelling interest issue). However, there are five members of the Court who would have held that the government has satisfied the compelling interest test. See id. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (compelling interest in providing insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female employees broadly); id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, finding a compelling interest in public health and women's well-being broadly). 10 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (finding it unnecessary to adjudicate the compelling interest issue). exemptions already in place, the lack of evidence supporting the government's claim that the Mandate furthers women's health, and the small impact the Mandate has on a national scale for employers whose sincerely held religious beliefs are not substantially burdened by its imposition. Part III gives the current status of the Zubik cases, which in part involve the subject of this Note.
I. BACKGROUND AND ESTABLISHING SCOPE

A. RFRA: The Compelling Interest Test
RFRA's compelling interest test provides that: "Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest . . . ."
11
This protection is greater than the balancing test used by the Court in the Sherbert line of cases, representing a legislative effort to protect religious freedom by a measure more than required by the First Amendment alone.
12
A compelling governmental interest under RFRA must be supported by two frontsfirst, it must be specific to the case at hand, 13 and second, the government's actions must be in furtherance of its asserted interest. 14 As to the first measure, RFRA contemplates an inquiry "more focused" than interests "couched in very broad terms" such as promoting public health or gender equality. 15 RFRA "requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened." 16 This analysis requires the Court to "loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests" and "scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants." 17 In other words, RFRA requires that the Court "look 11 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). 12 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 ("RFRA did more than merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases; it provided even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those decisions."). 18 As to the second measure, the government must evidence how a specific religious burden advances its interest.
19
This analysis looks to the exemptions and exceptions to the law, 20 especially where they are only available for secular 21 or certain religious reasons.
22
In essence, the "in furtherance of" analysis looks to whether the manner in which the regulatory scheme was crafted is consistent with its asserted interest. 19 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 433 ("It is established in strict scrutiny jurisprudence that a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.") (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)). 20 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47 ("Where government . . . fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling."). 21 If the government's interests are not "pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct," that is evidence that granting a religious exemption would not truly undercut any compelling interest. 
B. The Organizations and Their Beliefs
In order to reach the compelling interest test, a claimant must first prove that they face a substantial burden 24 on a sincerely-held 25 religious belief. 26 This Note assumes that the claimant has already done so. To bolster this assumption, 27 this Note further assumes that the claimant is either a religious non-profit 28 or a closely-held business.
29
To further limit this Note's scope, the belief proffered by the business is assumed to be that human life begins at conception, and that deliberate destruction 24 Demonstrating that a law that requires, subject to penalty, the claimant to violate their sincere religious belief is generally sufficient to meet the substantial burden requirement. See, e.g., Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (claimant faced disciplinary action for growing a beard in accordance with Muslim faith); O Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 426 (claimant prohibited from drinking sacramental tea due to its hallucinogenic effect). 25 It is worth emphasizing that the burden on the claimant is to prove mere sincerity, not validity, of a religious belief. The Court has repeatedly recognized that judging the validity of a religious belief is an improper undertaking for the tribunal. E.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 ("[The government] and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step."); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim."). 26 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2012). 27 Although the proceeding argument would apply with equal force to for-profit businesses in similar factual circumstances, including public corporations, the Court's pre-Hobby Lobby jurisprudence is unkind to religious claims by an organization purposed to make a profit. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) ("When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity."). Although Lee is a pre-RFRA case, Justice Ginsburg argues in dissent-with the support of three other Justices-that Lee should have controlled Hobby Lobby's outcome. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is unclear if the Court will follow Hobby Lobby when presented with a for-profit religious claimant in the future, or if the jurisprudence will return to Lee's restrictive approach. See Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 220-32 (2015) (arguing that sex and sexual orientation cabin Hobby Lobby's rationale). 29 Closely-held businesses are those "owned and controlled by members of a single family." Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. 
41
HRSA determined which preventative care fell within the Mandate by consulting a non-profit group of volunteer advisors, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM").
42
Based on IOM's recommendations, HRSA promulgated the Women's Preventative Services Guidelines, which provide that nonexempt employers must provide coverage, without cost sharing, for all contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").
43
Although the majority of the FDAapproved methods of contraception work by preventing the fertilization of an egg, the broad definition suggested by IOM and adopted by HRSA include the 37 The difference between exceptions and exemptions is duly noted. However, when discussing the ACA both will be referred to as "exemptions" for simplicity's sake and to avoid unneeded equivocation or confusion. 38 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 39 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 40 A plausible argument against the existence of a compelling governmental interest behind the Mandate that this note will not pursue is that, because the Mandate is a regulatory rather than statutory requirement, it cannot qualify as a compelling interest under RFRA. contraceptives that operate by preventing an already fertilized egg from further development via implantation.
44
HRSA was also authorized to establish an exemption from the Mandate for "religious employers." 45 The religious employer exemption HRSA adopted encompasses only churches and their integrated auxiliaries. 46 HRSA explained that this exemption was designed to protect only "house[s] of worship" while excluding their non-profit charitable and educational arms. 47 Notably, this particular exemption categorically applies to all entities that fall within its definition, regardless of whether the entities actually object to compliance. 48 In addition, Congress created a broad exemption for "grandfathered health plans"-those that existed prior to March 23, 2010-and did not make specific changes after that date.
49
There is no legal requirement that these grandfathered plans ever be phased out 50 -employers may add new employees to the grandfathered plans and adjust certain costs without becoming subject to the Mandate. 51 However, even those grandfathered plans were not exempted from compliance with certain "particularly significant" protections of the ACA. protections of the ACA. 53 As a second legislative exemption, employers with fewer than fifty full-time employees are not required to provide health insurance at all, much less comply with the Mandate. 54 Therefore, religious non-profits that do not qualify for the religious, small business, or grandfathered plan exemptions must provide contraception that operates to prevent the implantation and further development of a human embryo in order to comply with the Mandate promulgated by HRSA. 55 In other words, if the non-profit is not a "house of worship" according to the exemption created by HRSA, it must comply with the Mandate even though the non-profit would otherwise qualify for federal conscience protection in other healthcare and employment decisions.
56
II. COMPELLING INTEREST: THE CONTROVERSY
Two recent decisions, O Centro and Holt, provide guidance for the compelling interest test's application.
57
In O Centro, a minority religion with origins in the Amazon Rainforest was prohibited from receiving its communion, which consisted of sacramental tea brewed from plants containing a hallucinogen regulated under the 53 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(4). Some portions of the ACA that Congress deemed "particularly significant" over the preventative services requirement include the elimination of lifetime limits and covering dependents up to age 26. 55 Nonexempt religious employers who hold sincere religious objections to contraception must comply with the Mandate through an "accommodation." ETBU Brief, supra note 23, at 18-20. The details of the accommodation are complex and beyond the scope of this Note, but its objective is to effectuate contraceptive coverage from inside the employer's "insurance coverage network" using the employer's existing "coverage administration infrastructure" to make the coverage flow. Id.; Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,328 (July 14, 2015). Therefore, there is significant differential treatment between truly exempt religious employers and those who must comply with the Mandate via the "accommodation." Exempt employers need not file any form with the government while nonexempt employers must provide the government information about their insurance network as a necessary condition for ensuring that cost-free contraceptive coverage is provided through their own plan infrastructure. ETBU Brief, supra note 23, at 19. This Note pertains to nonexempt religious employers described in Part I(B) infra who must comply with the Mandate, whether through the accommodation or otherwise. 56 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012) (safeguarding entities that oppose sterilization or abortion on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions); id. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (precluding Medicare plans from being forced to provide certain services to which sponsors object on moral or religious grounds); id.
§ 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (precluding same for Medicaid); id. § 2000e-1(a) (allowing religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, or societies to use religion as a criterion in employment decisions). The sect sued under RFRA to block enforcement of the Act's ban of the sacramental tea. 59 The government's primary position was that it had a compelling interest in the uniform application of the Act, such that no exception could be made to accommodate the sect's concededly sincere religious practice. 60 Unanimously, 61 the Court held that the government had not carried their burden of proving a compelling interest under RFRA. 62 The O Centro Court held that although Congress had a compelling interest in generally banning Schedule I substances due to their dangerous nature, mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances could not meet its burden in this specific case. 63 RFRA required a "more focused inquiry" whereby the government must consider the harms posed by the particular use at issue-the circumscribed, sacramental use of the tea by the church. 64 The government could not show that it considered such use when listing the substance under Schedule I, and the Court held that Congress's determination that the tea's hallucinogen be listed under Schedule I did not provide a categorical answer to relieve the government of the obligation to shoulder that burden of proof. 65 Further, the O Centro Court did not find the Government's asserted interestuniform application of the Act-to be genuine, as the Act contained an exemption made to a Schedule I ban for religious use. The Native American Church for thirty five years enjoyed a regulatory exemption 67 for the use of peyote, an exemption extended by Congress to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe.
68
Comparing the religious use of peyote to the religious use of the sacramental tea, the Court found 58 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 423. 59 Id. 60 
Id.
61 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the eight-justice Court; Justice Alito took no part in the decision. Id. at 422. 62 Id. at 439. 63 Id. at 432. 64 Id. 65 Id. it "difficult to see how" Congress could rely on the same findings of fact to justify exempting one and banning the other. 69 In Holt, an Arkansas inmate and devout Muslim wished to grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious belief, but he was precluded from doing so due to the Arkansas Department of Correction's grooming policy. 70 The petitioner sued under RLUIPA 71 to block the shaving of his beard.
72
The government's primary position was that it had a compelling interest in prison safety and security such that an exception could not be made to accommodate the inmate's sincere religious exercise. 72 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859. 73 Id. at 863. 74 Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion of her own. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Holt is of particular interest because Holt was handed down only one year after Hobby Lobby. As previously noted, Justice Ginsburg's four-member dissent in Hobby Lobby would have found that the government proved a compelling interest "in public health and women's well being," interests which she found "concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence." Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby, however, does not undergo RFRA's focused compelling interest analysis that she and all other members of the Court supported in both O Centro and Holt-her Hobby Lobby dissent does not consider how the broad governmental interests in public health and women's well being, that are supported by empirical evidence generally, would be affected by the exemption of Hobby Lobby specifically. See id. Justice Ginsburg takes two sentences to explain her shift of supporting a focused interest inquiry in O Centro to a general interest inquiry in Hobby Lobby and back to a focused interest inquiry in Holt. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg explained that unlike the exemption approved by the Court in Hobby Lobby, the exemption approved in Holt (and presumably in O Centro) "would not detrimentally affect others who do not share petitioner's belief." Id.
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). From Justice Ginsburg's Holt concurrence, it is unclear why she believes that an exemption's effect on third parties controls the scope of the compelling interest analysis (a general inquiry when third parties are affected versus a focused inquiry when no third parties are affected). Nothing in RFRA's text or its basic purposes support changing the scope of the compelling interest inquiry based on third party benefits, although third party benefits could certainly be factors considered in a focused compelling interest inquiry and the accompanying least restrictive means analysis. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. The Holt Court found the government's argument "hard to take seriously" that allowing Petitioner's half-inch beard would compromise the compelling interest of prison safety by enabling the flow of contraband.
76
Although prison officials are due respect as experts in their opinions evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, "a degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning acceptance" would have been necessary to accept the government's argument. 77 The Court, unwilling to abdicate the responsibility conferred by Congress to apply RLUIPA and RFRA's rigorous compelling interest inquiry, did not afford the government that unwavering deference.
78
Neither did the Holt Court accept the government's second argument, that its grooming policy is necessary to further the compelling interest of security by preventing prisoners from disguising their identities. 79 The Court held that the government failed to prove why the risk that a prisoner will shave a half-inch beard to disguise himself is so great that half-inch beards cannot be allowed, even though prisoners were allowed a quarter-inch beard under an exemption for medical reasons.
80
The quarter-inch beards allowed for medical reasons, like the half-inch beard requested by Petitioner for religious reasons, could be shaved off at a moment's notice, but the government "apparently d[id] not think that this possibility raise[d] a serious security concern." 81 Finally, the Court held that the government did not adequately respond to two arguments implicated in the compelling interest analysis: why its grooming policy is substantially underinclusive and why the vast majority of states and the federal government can permit inmates to grow half-inch beards for religious reasons, but Arkansas cannot. 82 As to the underinclusive argument, the Court held that a half-inch 75 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859. 76 Id. at 863. 77 Id. at 864. 78 Id. 79 Id. at 864-65. 80 Id. at 865. 81 Id. beard would not impair a compelling interest in safety any more than the quarterinch beard already allowed, and rejected the government's argument as a reformulation of the "classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions." 83 As to the second argument, the Court held that when so many exemptions exist, at a minimum, the government must offer persuasive reasons why it believes that it must take a different course in a particular instance.
84
In sum, the Court in O'Centro and Holt made clear that RFRA's "to the person" language requires a "focused inquiry" whereby the government must substantiate their compelling interest to the specific religious objectors. 85 Further, the government's compelling interest may be undercut by exemptions 86 and a failure to consider relevant factors that may affect the purported interest.
87
A. To the Person
Similar to Holt and O Centro, the government cannot prove a compelling interest in enforcing the Mandate so as to substantially burden the sincere religious exercise of religious non-profits and closely-held businesses. The government has supported its interest by stating that "requiring [women] to take steps to learn about, and sign up for, a new health benefit, would make that coverage accessible to fewer women." 88 This claim, however, is unsubstantiated by any meaningful evidence. Like in O Centro, even if the government has a compelling interest in enforcing a law as a general matter, that does not provide a categorical justification for denying a specific exemption for the narrow category of religious objectors. 89 In Hobby Lobby, the government did not assert a compelling interest sufficient to meet RFRA's focused inquiry. 90 Instead, the government put forth three interests 83 couched in broad terms: (1) protection of rights of corporate-respondents' employees in a comprehensive insurance system, (2) public health, and (3) equal access for women to health-care services. 91 Although the government mentioned once at argument and once in its brief that the employees of Hobby Lobby and Mardel and their covered family members would be affected, the government never particularized how they would be affected if the closely-held businesses were granted a religious objector exemption. 92 Instead, the government's argument rested on the general findings that led to the Mandate's promulgation and concluded, ipso facto, that the same findings apply to Hobby Lobby and Mardel specifically. 93 Such an ipse dixit cannot carry the day for the government. Like in O Centro, RFRA requires a "more focused inquiry" whereby the government must consider the harms posed by the particular exemption at issue-the exemption requested by Hobby Lobby and Mardel. 94 In Zubik v. Burwell 
98
The government's only attempt at satisfying RFRA's focused compelling interest inquiry was the bald assertion that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that all women, including those employed by religious non-profits, can make the choice of whether to take the objected-to contraception 99 -which if true, still did not meet the burden of evidencing a compelling interest as to the seven consolidated petitioners. 100 As in Holt, the Court should have been unwilling to abdicate the responsibility conferred by Congress to apply RFRA's rigorous compelling interest inquiry, 101 and not afforded the government unwavering deference in broad assertions to specific cases.
102
One of the Zubik cases, Little Sisters of the Poor, provides a perfect example. Little Sisters is a Catholic non-profit whose insurance coverage consists of both a church plan 103 (the Christian Brothers Benefits Trust, or the "Trust") and a third party is that an employer should file the paperwork and violate "a basic principle of faith," rather than the employee assume the "administrative burden" of filing the paperwork. Id. at 75. 98 Zubik Government Brief, supra note 4, at 54-58. 99 Id. at 59. At oral arguments, the government asserted that several issues would arise if female employees obtained contraceptive coverage through an exchange rather than their employers. See Zubik Transcript, supra note 97, at 79-80. The issues are generally that a woman would not be able to go to her regular doctor, would have to pay for the doctor, and would have to pay for the contraceptive coverage. Id. Such concerns assume that if contraceptive-only plans were available on the exchanges that (1) doctors would not accept them, (2) a single doctor would not accept as payment insurance for one set of advice and a separate insurance for another set of advice, and (3) the employees, rather than the government or a segregated fund, would have to pay for coverage. The government never gave foundation for those assumptions. Id. And because Congress has accommodated the religious beliefs of the Trust and the TPA, the government concedes it has no authority to force Little Sisters' insurance to provide contraceptives in compliance with the Mandate.
107
The government, however, insists that its compelling interest is not undermined by its reliance on the voluntary participation of the Trust and TPA, 108 even though both have stated in no uncertain terms that they will under no circumstances voluntarily provide contraception pursuant to the Mandate. 109 Such a conjecture cannot possibly satisfy RFRA's focused compelling interest test.
110
"If the government is going to assert the extraordinary power to override concededly sincere religious beliefs, then at the very least it should be required to demonstrate that doing so will actually-not just hypothetically-'further[]' its purportedly 'compelling interest. '" 111 However, there is one degree of separation between cases involving the Mandate and Holt and O Centro-one that works against the Mandate being supported by a compelling interest. In both Holt and O Centro, the law that substantially burdened sincere religious exercise was a statute promulgated by Congress, whereas the Mandate is purely a result of administrative rulemaking. In the ACA, Congress did not mandate abortifacients and contraception in general, much less in connection with health plans of religious non-profits and closely-held businesses. 112 As the Mandate for non-profit organizations and closely-held businesses is the result of administrative rulemaking, the same bureaucracy that created it could unilaterally decide to revoke it at any time.
113
Even further, where 104 Id. at 15-16 ("A third party administrator . . . is the entity that a self-insured plan typically uses to process claims."). 105 Id. at 68-69. 106 Id. 107 
Id.
108 Zubik Government Brief, supra note 4, at 60. 112 Zubik Petitioner Brief, supra note 89, at 62. 113 Id. Congress did explicitly address the importance of the Mandate, it chose not to include it as part of the "particularly significant" protections of the ACA. 114 As Congress chose to "leave[] unprohibited" the option of eliminating the Mandate altogether-or never mandating abortifacients in the first place-the Mandate cannot possibly be considered necessary to protect "an interest 'of the highest order. '" 115 Giving administrative agencies such unfettered discretion "is not how [Congress] addresses a serious social problem" where it determines that there is a compelling interest.
116
This is especially true where the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion-protected first by the First Amendment and further by RFRA-is implicated.
117
B. In Furtherance Of
Exemptions Abound
The government also cannot carry its burden under the second prong of the compelling interest analysis-that substantially burdening the sincere religious exercise of religious non-profits and closely-held businesses actually furthers the alleged compelling interest.
118
Like in Holt and O Centro, the government's refusal to extend an exemption to religious non-profits and closely-held businesses that can establish a substantial burden on sincere religious exercise is undermined by the already existing exemptions to the Mandate.
As already noted, grandfathered plans are exempt from the Mandate entirely by virtue of their statutory exemption from providing coverage for women's preventative care.
119
This broad exemption was given to "avoid the inconvenience of amending an existing plan." 
121
The Mandate is expressly excluded from the "particularly significant" subset.
122
Congress's choice not to include the Mandate as a "particularly significant" protection 123 excludes a substantial number of employees from the Mandate's provision, as "over one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in America with employer-sponsored health plans were enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2013." 124 As the grandfathered plan exemption has no phase-out, 125 there is no reason for that number to decrease. In fact, a recent survey found that 35% of all employers and 25% of all covered employees in the nation are insured by a grandfathered plan.
126
In addition to grandfathered plans, Congress exempted small businesses from following the Mandate-indeed, small businesses are not required to provide any health insurance coverage at all. 127 Therefore, if a small business objects to contraceptive coverage, it can decline to provide any coverage and face no penalty. 127 Shared responsibility for employers regarding health coverage, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012). 128 In the Zubik oral arguments, the government attempted to distinguish obstacles that a female employee who desires free contraception would face where her employer is a small business that does not provide any health insurance from obstacles the same employee would face where her employer is a religious nonprofit whose health insurance does not include contraception. Zubik Transcript, supra note 97, at 71. The distinction offered is that under the former permissible instance, the employee already has to get insurance. Id. However, under the latter impermissible instance, the employee has to obtain separate contraceptive insurance in addition to her regular health insurance. Id. Essentially, the line between permissible and impermissible obstacles is not whether the employee will have to avail herself of the exchange for To be sure, if one of the more than eighty million employees or their beneficiaries who are not guaranteed access to free contraception due to the grandfathered plan and small business exemptions desired to procure free contraceptives, they may avail themselves by purchasing a plan or supplementing their current coverage on an exchange.
131
The government has deemed this method a sufficient "gap-filling" measure. 132 Therefore, the government's claim that its interest in enforcing HRSA's regulatory definition of "preventative services" is so compelling as to preclude religious exemptions is severely undercut since Congress not only "contemplate [d] ," but actually created exemptions to the preventative services requirement for more than a quarter of private sector employees, pursuant to which the Mandate was created.
133
Like in Holt, when so many exemptions already exist, the government must, at a minimum, offer a persuasive reason why it believes that it must take a different course in each particular instance.
134
The current exemptions are not limited to those created by Congress. After creating the Mandate by defining "preventative services," HRSA created a religious exemption for houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries, treating them the same as grandfathered plans.
135
By making the religious exemption in accordance coverage, but whether the employee will have to carry one or two insurance cards. It is worth noting that this justification for the small business exemption does not support the compelling governmental interest of "seamless" coverage that was offered at oral arguments, supra note 97, because in either instance above, the employee must avail herself of the exchange to obtain the coverage desired. the accommodation is tied not to religious beliefs or practices, but to the form in which the organization is incorporated. This is because HRSA provided for the exemption to apply automatically to any organization within its definition, regardless of whether they hold a sincere religious objection. 137 Therefore, organizations within HRSA's religious exemption definition may deny employees access to contraceptives based on cost or convenience without a sincerely held religious belief as to their use.
If the government's asserted interests in the Mandate do not preclude it from granting exemptions to "thousands of [non-profits] practicing their faith" without regard to whether their faith actually leads them to object to such coverage, "it is difficult to see how those same [interests] can preclude any consideration of a similar exception" for other religious non-profits who want to practice their faith. 138 The government maintains that houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries are more likely than their separately incorporated non-profit charitable and educational arms to employ people of the same faith who would share the same objection to abortifacients. 139 However, the government has no support for this assumption, as there is no requirement that houses of worship or their integrated auxiliaries primarily employ only people of the same faith. 140 The government explains that there is no such requirement because it intended to ensure that a religious employer would not be disqualified from the exemption because the employer hires or serves people of different faiths.
141
Setting aside that the government's explanation for the lack of such a requirement cuts against its reasoning for disallowing an exemption for the nonprofit charitable and educational arms of religious entities, separately incorporated non-profits have the same freedom to hire based on an employee's faith under Title VII as houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries. HRSA exempted some religious non-profits from the Mandate even if they do not hire any employees of the same faith and have no religious objection to the mandate, yet still demand compliance from other religious non-profits even if they hire only employees of the same faith and do object on religious grounds.
144
Having excused compliance with the Mandate for some on religious grounds, the government's rationale for denying exemptions to other similarly situated religious non-profits is based solely on the organization's method of incorporation.
145
This distinction as the basis for refusing to accommodate a sincere exercise of religious belief is like the purportedly crucial difference between a quarter-inch and half-inch beard in Holt-"hard to take seriously." 
147
Its counterpart to the north, Catholic Charities of Erie, is formally operated as a department of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie.
148
Because of these differing arrangements, Catholic Charities of Pittsburgh must comply with the Mandate, while Catholic Charities of Erie is considered exempt as a religious employer.
149
In every material respect, the two organizations are identical: they operate in adjacent counties, employ the same type of people, and perform the same religious mission.
150
"Everything th[at could be said] about [the exempt entity] applies in equal measure to" the non-exempt entity, both of which are religious nonprofit groups.
151
There is no rational basis to treat the two entities differently- 163 loss of bone mineral density, 164 more than double the risk of breast cancer, 165 and double the risk of acquiring and transmitting HIV. 166 Rather than addressing and balancing the significantly increased risks of these serious conditions, the IOM Report selectively focused on the non-contraceptive benefits of oral contraception, including treatment of menstrual disorders and acne. raise[] a serious . . . concern" for women's health. 168 As the IOM Report relied on by HRSA in establishing the Mandate entirely ignored the mandated drugs' serious health risks, the Mandate cannot meet the RFRA requirement of being in furtherance of the asserted compelling interest in promoting women's health. Aside from failing to consider the risks of taking the mandated contraceptives, the government has failed to demonstrate any causal relationship between the Mandate and improved health for women. 169 While the government claims cost is a significant barrier to use of contraceptives 170 such that that access to free contraception is necessary, the evidence available and cited in the IOM Report indicates that cost plays a small role in women's decisions about contraception. 171 In fact, the government's own reports concede that the primary reasons that women choose to eschew contraception are its side effects, health risks, and failure rate. 172 Therefore, the government has not shown that the Mandate actually increased usage of contraceptives. 173 But even if the Mandate could increase the usage of contraceptives, the government has not substantiated its claim that this will lead to lower rates of unintended pregnancy and abortion. contraception could lead to fewer unintended pregnancies, the government has not linked unintended pregnancy with specific health outcomes for women.
177
The government has published regulations making specific claims linking unintended pregnancy to smoking, drinking, depression, and violence, 178 but nowhere does the government, or the IOM Report it relies on, demonstrate this nexus.
179
In fact, an IOM report from 1995 acknowledges that extant studies were unable to demonstrate whether the health effects that the government cites were "caused by or merely associated with unwanted pregnancy." 180 Therefore, as the government has not shown the Mandate to actually improve women's health, the Mandate cannot meet the RFRA requirement of being in furtherance of the asserted compelling interest in promoting women's health.
3. Un-compelling or Unneeded?
Finally, assuming arguendo that the government had substantiated a compelling interest for the Mandate to satisfy RFRA, it is unclear whether the Mandate itself-enormous existing exemptions aside-substantially furthered that interest. When passed, over 85% of employer-sponsored health insurance plans already provided the coverage required by the Mandate. 181 Further, the government found that the coverage required by the Mandate was at least cost neutral, and may in some instances result in cost savings. 182 Therefore, the Mandate could not have affected more than 15% of employers nationwide (less taking the grandfathered plan and small business exemptions into account) and was not purposed to effectuate a cost-prohibitive measure. Given that the possible impact of the Mandate, even without pre-existing congressional exemptions, is relatively low on a national scale and the Mandate's coverage is at least cost neutral, only those employers objecting 177 Id. at 30-36. 
III. ZUBIK: THE CURRENT STATUS
As previously mentioned, a group of seven consolidated cases--the Zubik cases--were recently before the Supreme Court. Because the cases in part concern this Note's thesis, a brief update on their evolving status is included. On March 29, 2016, only six days after oral arguments, the Court made a rare request for supplemental briefing. 184 The Court essentially suggested a result by way of a specific hypothetical outcome for the parties to consider, making the request even more extraordinary. 185 Both parties' supplemental briefs and supplemental reply briefs mainly focused on whether the posited hypothetical was sufficiently narrowly tailored. Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury filed a Request for Information ("RFI") seeking comment on whether there are alternative ways (other than those offered in current regulations) for eligible organizations that object to providing coverage for contraceptive services on religious grounds to obtain an accommodation, while still ensuring that women enrolled in the organizations' health plans have access to seamless coverage of the full range of Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptives without cost sharing. 191 The comment period ended September 20, 2016 192 and the request garnered over 149 public comments. 193 Simultaneously, on July 21, 2016, the government filed a status report in all seven Zubik cases notifying the various Courts of Appeals of the RFI and of the government's intent to enforce the mandate against Petitioners until the existing regulations are changed.
194
CONCLUSION
Under RFRA, the government lacks a compelling interest in enforcing the Mandate against any religious non-profit or closely-held business after such organization demonstrates a substantial burden in the sincere exercise of its religion. The government has not, in any case, even attempted to furnish evidence to prove that the Mandate's application to claimants objecting based on a sincerely held belief is a compelling interest. 195 The government also has failed to show how disallowing an exemption to such claimants would further any purported interest on three fronts. 196 First, the substantial exemptions that already exist undermine any argument
